Archive for July, 2009

One-Week Jobs: Not Very Stimulating

Kurt Brouwer July 29th, 2009

Don Surber reports on one of the economic stimulus program’s apparent ‘job creation’ successes, the one-week job:

…In Oregon, Democrats are touting 3,256 jobs that its $176 million stimulus already created.

AP checked. Those jobs last about a week.

That is $53,746.93 each for jobs that last a week.

…AP reported: “At the federal level, President Barack Obama has said the federal stimulus has created 150,000 jobs, a number based on a misused formula and which is so murky it can’t be verified.”

I’m sure the stimulus spending covered more than these jobs that only lasted 35 hours, but this sort of fact fudging does not help government’s credibility, which has taken quite a few hits lately.

See also:

Banks Use Bailout Bucks to Lobby Congress

60% Say No More Stimulus Please

Government Mail: U.S. Post Office Is Broke

Government Mail: U.S. Post Office Is Broke

Kurt Brouwer July 29th, 2009

The U.S. Post Office is broke says the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).  That’s unsettling.

In the past few months, the government has taken effective control of two major automobile companies (GM and Chrysler) as well as companies holding about half of all U.S. home mortgages (Fannie Mae and Fredddie Mac), not to government’s stake in major banks and insurance companies.  And, Congress is debating a vast expansion of Federal government activity in huge swathes of the economy including energy (cap and trade) and healthcare (universal healthcare).

GAO: Largest Civilian Government Agency Is Near Insolvency

Yet, we hear from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that the largest civilian government agency, the Post Office, is essentially broke.  The U.S. Post Office has over 700,000 employees and controls 38,000 facilities, so it’s pretty big.  However, delivering the mail isn’t exactly the same as brain surgery.  I know a little about delivering mail from a short summertime stint as a mailcarrier many years ago.

Since then, I have not thought about the Post Office much, other than to occasionally wonder why prices go up every couple of years. I suppose we are all resigned to steady increases in the price of stamps, but we seldom stop to check out just how much they have gone up over time:

cd-stamp-gas-5-09.JPG

Source: Carpe Diem

Mark Perry at Carpe Diem put the price increase for stamps in its historical context here:

If stamp prices had increased over time at “only” the rate of gas prices, a first-class stamp would only cost only 17 cents today instead of 44 cents. If stamp prices had increased at the same rate as consumer prices in general, stamps today would cost about 25 cents…

Is delivering a letter so much more complex than drilling for oil, shipping it and refining it and then getting it to your local gas station? Obviously not. Then, what justifies a price increase at more than twice the rate of inflation? It is not as if mail delivery has gotten so much better or faster over time.

Government Monopoly

I recognize that mail volume is falling, in part due to changes in how we send messages (email etc), but also the recession and other factors.  However, all businesses have to deal with technological changes and business cycles.  Why is the Post Office failing? One additional issue is competition.  Two major companies, FedEx and UPS, have taken away a lot of package deliveries that once would have fallen to the Post Office. However, nothing prevents the Post Office from competing with them, yet they have thrived.

The only answer I can come up with is that our regular mail service is a government monopoly and not subject to normal issues of supply and demand. I wonder what the price of gas would be if it were produced by a government agency? Despite raising prices far faster than the rate of inflation, the Post Office still cannot operate profitably.  In fact, it has operated at a deficit for years and is now out of cash.

This report from the GAO tells the tale [emphasis added]:

Restructuring the U.S. Post Office to Achieve Sustainable Financial Viability (Government Accounting Office, July 2009)

GAO is adding the U.S. Postal Service’s (USPS) financial condition to the list of high-risk areas needing attention by Congress and the executive branch to achieve broad-based transformation. Amid challenging economic conditions and a changing business environment, USPS is facing a deteriorating financial situation in which it does not expect to cover its expenses and financial obligations in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. This year, USPS expects to increase its year-end debt to $10.2 billion and incur a cash shortfall of about $1 billion…

The GAO reports the cash shortfall as about $1 billion, but to reach that number it drily noted (in a footnote) that it had assumed unspecified ’savings’ of $5.9 billion.   Those savings have not yet been realized, so the shortfall could be much higher.

…Other actions that USPS has proposed that would require congressional approval include the following:

1.  Change funding requirements for retiree health benefits: USPS has asked Congress to revise the funding requirements for its retiree health benefit obligation as it does not expect to make the full amount of its $5.4 billion retiree health benefit payment at the end of this fiscal year due to a cash shortage.

2.  Realign delivery services with changing use of mail: USPS has asked Congress to allow it to reduce delivery from 6 to 5 days per week as its revenue per delivery has declined 20 percent from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2009, as have pieces of mail delivered per address.

…To address its short- and long-term challenges, USPS should develop and implement a broad restructuring plan-with input from the Postal Regulatory Commission and other stakeholders and approval by Congress and the administration-that includes key milestones and time frames for actions, addresses key issues, and identifies what steps Congress and other stakeholders may need to take.

The GAO does not suggest a timeframe for how long it might take to develop and implement a restructuring plan that requires input from a postal commission, other unnamed stakeholders such as unions, along with Congress and the administration, but I suspect it will be a long time coming.

Rather than adding major new initiatives such as an energy tax and regulatory scheme or healthcare reform, shouldn’t Congress be focused on fixing existing government institutions such as the Post Office or Medicare?  As we wrote in an earlier post called, Why Not Fix Medicare First?:

It seems eminently sensible to me that we would reform Medicare first before subjecting everyone in the country to a wrenching change in how we insure our healthcare costs.  This comment by John Thacker (see final comment here) was picked up and quoted by Megan McArdle at the link above.  Thacker’s points seems both perfectly obvious and perfectly clear:

I completely fail to grasp this magical argument whereby Medicare is unreformable now, but adding even more patients to the rolls will create the incentive for exactly the sort of cost-cutting reforms that people hated when the HMOs were doing them in the early ’90s, and got laws passed to prevent.

I’m generally an optimist, but I fail to see much likelihood that Post Office (or Medicare) will turn around any time soon.  What about you?

Food Costs Decline vs Personal Income

Kurt Brouwer July 27th, 2009

A couple of weeks ago, I did some shopping in a Whole Foods store and was reminded of the amazing quality and variety of food we have available to us on a routine basis.

wikipedia-commons-corn-usda-small-800px-gem_corn.JPG

Source: Wikipedia Commons - USDA

Even more amazing is the fact that food is remarkably — and historically — very cheap when measured against our personal income. Here is a nice chart from Carpe Diem on the decline — yes decline — in food cost as a percentage of disposable personal income over the past 80 years:

cd-food.jpg

Source: Carpe Diem

The magic in these statistics is that our disposable personal income has gone up fairly steadily over the decades, but the cost of food has not increased at the same rate.  Hence, the cost of food as a percentage of personal income is falling.

This data is from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (see here for much more detail) measures the cost of food as a percentage of disposable personal income (income after taxes).  The USDA has been tracking this information for decades and it measures the cost of food both for eating at home and eating out.

For example, in 2008 Americans spent a total of 9.6% of their disposable income on food.  Of the total, 5.6% (almost 60%) was for food eaten at home and the balance was for food eaten elsewhere.  By way of contrast, in 1980, we spent 13.2% of our disposable personal income on food (9.0% on food at home and 4.2% on food away from home).  Further back, in 1960, we spent 17.5% on food (14.1% on food at home and 3.4% on food away from home).

Via: Carpe Diem and Casual Kitchen

Blackrock, Bonds & Bureaucrats

Kurt Brouwer July 27th, 2009

From the New York Times [emphasis added] we get this report on a new closed end investment fund from Blackrock.  Blackrock has gotten involved with the government throughout this financial panic and it seems to have figured how to get along — profitably — with the Federal bureaucracy.

Blackrock to Give the Public a Chance to Buy Troubled Assets (New York Times, July 26, 2009, Michael J. de la Merced)

…BlackRock is putting together an investment fund that it says will give ordinary Americans a chance to profit from the financial bailouts that they are paying for. The company quietly filed plans on Friday to raise money for the vehicle.

For investors, the potential risks are considerable. The closed-end fund is to buy distressed mortgage securities from financial companies — the very investments that have hurt so many banks. It would be the first product aimed specifically at Main Street that is linked to the government’s now-diminished Public-Private Investment Program, which is meant to help purge these institutions of their worrisome investments.

If the BlackRock fund does well — that is, if the troubled home loans and commercial mortgages it buys recover in value — individual investors could profit from PPIP, pronounced P-Pip. The program has met with a tepid response from banks and others, in part because bankers say they believe the markets are stabilizing and are thus reluctant to sell their troubled investments.

…The BlackRock fund, known as the BlackRock Legacy Securities Public-Private Trust, stemmed from discussions between the firm and the Obama administration about how to involve Main Street investors in the financial bailouts. None of the other bailout programs are open to individual investors.

…The fund will then take advantage of special financing the government is making available to participants in PPIP, an amount of up to one-third of the fund’s assets. (The Treasury Department will also hold warrants in the fund, which will give it an additional small cut of any profits the fund makes.)…

Here is a link to the regulatory filings on the fund.

California Pension Plan: Betting the house

Kurt Brouwer July 25th, 2009

From the New York Times [registration may be required] we get this report on the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), which is the largest pension plan in the nation.  CalPERS has struggled of late due to investment losses and funding issues.  It also has a credibility problem after helping bring about the current crisis in California public pensions.

Now, the investment chief for CalPERS is doing something that is quite unusual in that he is calling for the system to essentially bet billions on risky assets in the hopes of making a big gain [emphasis added below]:

CalPers Hopes Riskier Bet Will Restore Its Health (New York Times, July 23, 2009, Leslie Wayne)

Big as California’s budget woes are today, so are the problems lurking in its biggest pension fund.

The fund, known as Calpers, lost nearly $60 billion in the financial markets last year. Though it has more than enough money to make its payments to retirees for many years, it has a serious long-term shortfall. Meanwhile, local governments in the state are pleading poverty and saying they cannot make the contributions that would be needed to shore it up.

California’s public pension funding problem is one of the thorniest financial issues facing the state. The state made an unwise and almost certainly unsustainable deal to substantially raise public pension payouts approximately 10 years ago.  CalPERS played an important role in that disastrous decision (see Budget Busting Pensions).

The New York Times continues:

Those problems now rest largely on the slim shoulders of Joseph A. Dear, the fund’s new head of investments. He is not an investment seer by training, but he thinks he has the cure for what ails Calpers, or the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, the largest in the nation with $180 billion in assets.

Mr. Dear wants to embrace some potentially high-risk investments in hopes of higher returns. He aims to pour billions more into beaten-down private equity and hedge funds. Junk bonds and California real estate also ride high on his list. And then there are timber, commodities and infrastructure.

That’s right, he wants to load up on many of the very assets that have been responsible for the fund’s recent plunge. Calpers’s real estate portfolio has tumbled 35 percent, and its private equity holdings are down 31 percent. What is more, under Mr. Dear’s predecessor, Calpers had to sell stocks in a falling market last year to fulfill calls for cash from its private equity and real estate partnerships. That led to bigger losses in its stock portfolio.

CalPERS has made very significant investments in illiquid real estate and private equity partnerships.  Selling stocks last Fall to help keep those partnerships going may or may not have been a huge mistake, but it is certainly unusual behavior.

From the Sacramento Bee, here is a report on a billion dollar bust in CalPERS’ real estate portfolio.  The details do not sound encouraging:

…CalPERS made aggressive investments in real estate at the worst possible time, when inflated property values had peaked and were already beginning to decline.

As The Sacramento Bee’s Dale Kasler detailed in a recent article, one CalPERS real estate misstep stands out in particular. In February 2007, CalPERS invested $922 million in a deal with LandSource Communities Development LLC that involved thousands of homes and lots in seven states including Florida, Arizona and California.

A month before the investment was finalized, Lennar Homes, a principal partner in the LandSource deal, announced it was writing off $500 million in real estate assets because of deteriorating market conditions. That should have served as a clear warning to CalPERS, but it did not.

Sixteen months later, LandSource filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Depending on what assets the partnership sells to pay off creditors, CalPERS could lose its entire investment, nearly $1 billion...

In fairness, CalPERS made lots of money from its real estate investments over the years, so a billion dollar writeoff won’t break the bank.  However, the bankruptcy of a private real estate deal like this one should be a warning light that the partnership investments the plan already holds may have other unwelcome surprises.

Joseph Dear, CalPERS’ new investment head seems to be a smart guy and he is certainly well connected in a political sense.  He also seems to be a gutsy guy in that he is definitely making a bet — in effect, betting the retirement future of many Californians  — that the private partnerships he likes will outperform more traditional investments.

…He [Joseph A. Dear] was hired in large part for his management skills and political savvy - honed in Washington, where headed the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the Clinton years. He does not have an M.B.A. or any other advanced degree in finance. Harvard, Yale or Wharton is not on his résumé. Instead, his lone degree, in political economy, is from Evergreen State College in Olympia, Wash.

Most recently, Mr. Dear headed the Washington State public pension fund, which gained a reputation as a daring investor under his oversight. It risked more of its portfolio - 25 percent - on private equity than any other public fund. The bet pushed the Washington State Investment Board, which now has $67 billion in assets, into the top 1 percent of its peer group in performance during the boom years, according to Wilshire Associates. But in the fiscal year that ended last month, the fund lost 27 percent of its value, or $18 billion.

Calpers has a lot riding on Mr. Dear’s effort to achieve above-market performance. The fund just posted a loss of 23 percent, the worst in its history. That leaves it 66 percent funded, the lowest level in two decades, meaning it has only $66 on hand for every $100 in benefits promised to 1.6 million California public employees and their families.

… “Calpers is significantly underfunded, and they have decided that they will roll the dice,” said Edward A. H. Siedle, president of Benchmark Financial Services, which audits pension plans. “Is that appropriate if you have just lost 25 percent of your portfolio? These are high-risk, illiquid, unregistered products where there is tremendous valuation uncertainty. I would bet you any amount that five years from now, this plan will not have outperformed the market.”…

On one hand, I applaud CalPERS and its new head of investments for taking a bold and contrarian stand.  It may work and, if so, I will be very happy.  On the other hand, I question the motivation behind this move.  Is it the desire to follow a sound investment principle of adding to solid holdings when they have fallen in value? Or, is it a move like that of a gambler who suddenly decides to double down in order to erase a series of losing hands?

Via: Calculated Risk

See also:

Budget Busting Pensions

10 Rules for Investing

Oakland ‘Mulls’ Bankruptcy

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